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DE RUEHKT #2253/01 2301150 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 181150Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU TO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1897 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2829 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4679 RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 4917 RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0040 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2909 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4317 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0113 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0977 RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002253

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2016

TAGS: PGOV PTER NP

SUBJECT: UN TEAM EXPECTED IN KATHMANDU BY SEPTEMBER 1

REF: A. KATHMANDU 2166

¶B. KATHMANDU 2154

#### Summary

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11. (C) UNDP Resident Representative Mathew Kahane told DCM August 18 that a small UN team will arrive in Kathmandu by September 1 to start work on the 5-point GON/Maoist request to the UN for assistance (ref A). Kahane said that the five-person team would include representatives of UN technical agencies competent in each of the areas in which UN assistance was requested by the GON and Maoists. He expected arms management to be a contentious, complicated, and drawn-out process. Regarding monitors, the UNDP ResRep said that the UN was considering redeploying Nordic monitors who are being withdrawn from Sri Lanka. The UN team will work on an open-ended basis in Nepal under the aegis of the Secretary General.

# Five Areas of Requested Assistance

- 12. (C) Kahane reprised the five areas in which the GON and Maoists had requested UN assistance. He noted that in some areas, in particular human rights monitoring and cease fire code of conduct monitoring, UN agencies are already actively operating in Nepal. The five GON/Maoist requests to the UN (Ref A) follow:
- -- "Continue its human rights monitoring through the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal(OHCHR, Nepal)
- -- Assist the monitoring of the Code of Conduct during the ceasefire
- -- On the basis of the agreement to seek UN assistance in the "management of arms and armed personnel of both the sides," deploy qualified civilian personnel to monitor and verify the confinement of CPN-M combatants and their weapons within designated cantonment areas. Later the modalities for all agreements, including of arms and munitions, will be worked out among the parties and the UN.

- -- Monitor the Nepal Army to ensure that it remains in its barracks and its weapons are not used for or against any side. The modalities will be worked out among the parties and the UN
- -- Provide election observation for the election of the Constituent Assembly in consultation with the parties."

### Arms Management, Monitors

13. (C) Kahane said that he expected the issue of arms management to be particularly contentious and complicated, and to take a long time to resolve. He noted the vague language used in the GON/Maoist request to the UN for assistance on arms management. Getting to a point where the Maoists would agree to separation of arms under a dual key approach would take painstaking, extended, and time consuming negotiation, he warned. Kahane added that the 5-member UN team clearly would not be in a position to do any arms management monitoring itself. He said, however, that the UN had already given consideration to redeploying Finnish, Danish and Swedish cease-fire monitors who were being withdrawn from Sri Lanka to Nepal. The UNDP ResRep noted that the Norwegians and Danes had already approached the UN to offer monitoring assistance. Kahane did not know when monitors might be deployed to Nepal.

#### UN Mandate

14. (C) The UNDP ResRep told the DCM that the expected UN team would be working in Nepal on an open-ended basis under the aegis of the Secretary General. He noted that the SecGen has limited contingency funds which would cover the cost of the mission. According to Kahane, SG Anan has a personal interest in maintaining momentum on Nepal's transformation to a peaceful democracy. Anan had been so incensed at being lied to by King Gyanendra about his intention to restore democracy during a meeting in Jakarta in April of last year that the SecGen had retained a particular interest in Nepal. Kahane pointed out that deploying a UN mission under the good offices of the Secretary General severely constrained funding available for the mission. He regretted India's insistence that an expanded UN presence in Nepal not be under a Security Council mandate.

## Comment

15. (C) The impending arrival of the UN team is good news, and an important step in keeping the momentum up in Nepal's delicate peace process. The small UN team, while welcome, will be challenged by the expectations of both the GON and the Maoists. The GON, for its part, hopes the UN presence will force the Maoists to abandon violence and come into the political mainstream. The Maoists, on the other hand, seem to consider the UN useful idiots, harkening back to Lenin. Active assistance and advice for the UN effort by the U.S., India and other interested countries, especially potential monitor countries, will be essential to keeping Nepal's peace process on track. We must make clear to the UN team that we fully support the government's position that the Maoists can not enter an interim government until they are separated from their weapons.

MORIARTY